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Broad factors affecting human development over the
last two decades
1 That  of  «human  development»  is  not  a  new  concept,  but  is  certainly  one  that  has
attracted considerable policy and research attention over the last one and half decade. It
has also generated a lively political debate on the pattern and objectives of growth during
the  recent  wave  of  globalisation  and  helped  shifting  the  focus  of  national  and
international development policy away from the exclusive achievement of a higher GDP
per capita and towards more relevant and understandable objectives such as a longer life
expectancy, higher literacy and better nutrition. Perhaps the most telling indication of
the new interest in human development are the frequent references of the President of
the World Bank, Mr James Wolfensohn, to the fact that the scope of development is not to
increase the rate of growth of GDP but to improve the living standards of the poor and to
put a smile on their lips.
2 Despite the inevitable rhetoric’s surrounding this new approach, the concept of human
development is thus slowly gaining political currency in a number of countries and —
equally important — within the international community. Two sets of factors, discussed
hereafter, have likely facilitated the greater acceptance of such concept.
1. New measures of well-being
3 Traditionally, economists have measured «well-being» on the basis of GDP, income or
consumption per capita, or on the basis of the number of people falling below a given
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poverty line. While useful and widely applied, this approach suffers from considerable
theoretical  and  informational  problems  and  can  —  particularly  during  periods  of
profound transformations — lead to inaccurate conclusions. First of all, GDP, income or
consumption per capita ignore the distribution of these resources among the population,
social groups and genders. As amply demonstrated by the experience of many countries
during  the  1960s  and  1970s,  a  rise  in  GDP  per  capita  is,  by  itself,  no  guarantee  of
improvements in human well-being. Secondly, GDP per capita does not include the goods
and services produced outside the market sphere. Thirdly, many environmental, social
and other costs incurred for the production of GDP are not usually accounted for in its
measurement, thus inflating the actual measure of national well-being. Fourthly, several
other  factors  such as  assets,  human capital,  time,  family  structure  and stability,  the
availability of social services and so on influence in a major way the well-being of people.
Finally, contrary to an erroneous but common perception, income is not easily observable
and measurable, especially during periods of rapid change and high inflation.
4 While  these  problems  were  recognized  already  long  ago  and  while  a  number  of
alternative measures of  well-being were elaborated already in the 1970s to take into
account  the  inadequacies  of GDP per  capita,  it  was  not  until  Professor  Amartya Sen
developed the «Capabilities-based approach» (that was later operationalized through the
Human Development Index, HDI) that a politically-useful and alternative measure of well-
being came into being. HDI and similar indexes measure well-being on the basis of the
ability of  individuals to «function» i.e.  to have a long and healthy life,  of  being well
nourished, literate, safe, and so on. This approach emphasizes not so much the «means»
(money, wealth, etc.), but the «ends» (quality and quantity of life), the achievement of
which depends not only on control over monetary resources but also on many other
factors. 
5 Thanks to this and other methodological improvements including a massive increase of
statistical data on various aspects of well-being, the world in now better equipped to
document,  analyse  and  respond  to  the  low  levels  of  well-being  prevailing  in  many
developing countries. Other «realpolitik» factors have likely also plaid an important role
in  boosting  the  concern  for  human well-being  and  poverty  in  developing  countries.
Among them, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the end of the fear of nuclear holocaust,
mounting  worries  about  growing  political  instability  in  developing  and  transitional
countries,  the  control  of  a  rising  tide  of  illegal  migrants  and  mounting  fear  of  the
«negative externalities» of globalisation (drugs, AIOS, SARS, etc.).
6 Changes in these and other areas likely explain the recent blossoming of research on
human development and poverty-related topics as well as the surge in attention to the
issue of poverty reduction by a number of governments, the World Bank, IMF, United
Nations and many social scientists. All these researchers and institutions rightly see the
persistence of mass poverty and low human development not only as a major ethical and
political problem but also as a serious threat to political stability and a brake on long
term growth. This new awareness has triggered a few potentially important changes,
including  the  adoption  by  the  United  Nations  General  Assembly  of  the  Millennium
Development Goals  on the reduction of  poverty,  infant  mortality,  child malnutrition,
illiteracy and so on, the creation of new World Bank and IMF financial facilities aimed at
poverty  reduction,  and  the  preparation  in  several  developing  countries  of  Poverty
Reduction Framework Papers that try to focus the attention of the national elites and the
international community on the improvement of the living conditions of the poor. While
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it is too soon to assess the real impact of these changes, it goes by itself that they have the
potential to start making a serious dent into the long lasting problems of poverty and
inadequate human development.
 
2. Societal changes that ought to have facilitated human
development
7 Growing  attention  to  human  development  over  the  last  decade  and  a  half  was
accompanied by a number of profound systemic changes that — on the face of it — ought
to have accelerated its rate of improvement and enhanced economic growth:
 
 a) The «peace dividend»
8 The sudden collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the much welcome — if unanticipated — end of
the Cold War released a «peace dividend» of at least 3-4 percent of GDP in the main
countries part of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and in some of their allies in the developing
world. Data provided by the Swedish international Peace Research Institute confirm that
military expenditure declined perceptibly in the former USSR, the USA and several other
countries in the 1990s, thus releasing resources that could have been used for improving
human  development  in  developing  countries  or  to  raise  the  transfer  of  financial
resources from the industrialized to the developing countries in the form of loans or
grants.
9 The benefits for human development generated by the «peace dividend» was however in
part offset in several countries by a sharp rise in the number of local wars and complex
humanitarian emergencies (that climbed from 25 per year in the early 1980s to 50-55 in
the  mid  1990s  to  decline  slowly  thereafter)  that  wrecked  havoc  on  the  poor,  the
environment and the existing economic and social infrastructure. The factors behind this
rising  number  of  conflicts  include  mounting  polarisation  among  ethnic,  religious  or
economic groups, a weakening of the state and fights over natural resources such as land
or mineral rents. The smuggling of valuable commodities — such as diamonds and timber
— has been a major private incentive to continue local wars and a way to finance it.
 
b) The «demographic gift»
10 In the early stages of development, a factor holding back human development is a growth
of the population faster than that of the labour force. This entails a slow growth of GDP
per capita as comparatively few workers have to generate incomes for many dependent
children, (a situation graphically described as one in which there are «few arms and many
mouths») and a strong pressure on public finances to provide a minimum of  health,
sanitation and education services to a rapidly rising child population. Owing to the rapid
decline of their birth rate in the 1950s e 1960s, the Asian Tigers were among the first
countries to benefit from a change in this situation, and from the 1970s through the 1990s
they experienced a faster growth of  the labour force than of  the overall  population.
According to many, their «economic miracle» during this period (during which rose at
GDP per capita 7-8 percent a year) was in part due to such «demographic gift».
11 With the exception of a few African countries, during the last decade, most developing
countries,  including large ones such as Bangladesh, India,  Egypt and so on (Table 1),
experienced a sharp deceleration in birth rates and thus found themselves in a situation
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in  which their  labour force grew more rapidly  than the population,  a  situation that
should have — ceteris paribus — affected favourably the rate of growth of GDP and human
development. In simple economic terms, the «demographic gift» entails a rapid increase
in the labour force that reduces the wage rate and consumer prices and — ceteris paribus
— improves efficiency and competitiveness among national firms and between them and
foreign firms. 
 
c) The «market dividend»
12 While the socialist regimes performed acceptably in the first two decades of the post
World War II period, the growth of GDP and living standards decelerated sharply in the
1970s  in  China  and  in  the  1980s  in  the  European  Soviet  Bloc.  The  stagnation  was
particularly  pronounced  in  the  socialist  economies  of Europe.  This  creeping  crisis
gradually intensified over time and reached unmanageable proportions towards the end
of the 1980s.  By 1989,  the growth of  output and consumption per capita had turned
negative in practically all  countries of the region, at which point a radical change of
regime  became  unavoidable.  In  China,  Vietnam,  Laos,  Cambodia,  Mongolia,  and  five
partially socialized African economies the transition to the market economy was less
dramatic by was also stimulated by the loss of economic dynamism. Most analysts agree
that — particularly in Europe — such loss of economic drive was due to the rigidity and
lack  of  incentives  of  central  planning,  to  its  inability  to  generate  new technological
advances, and to its failure to reform itself along market lines.
13 In principle, therefore, the shift from a «stagnant central planning» to an «open and
competitive market economy» was to provide a major stimulus to growth and resources
for improving human development. In fact, however, the development benefits of such
«market  dividend» have  not,  or  not  yet,  been realized in  most  of  the  economies  in
transition, especially those of the former Soviet Union. In contrast, important gains were
realised in the Asian socialist economies. However, even in the successful cases of China
and Vietnam, human development improved far less than material affluence. In China,
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for instance, GDP per capita has increased by a stunning 400 percent over the last quarter
century but average life expectancy at birth has risen by a modest 2-3 years.
 
d) The «democracy dividend»
14 The last decade and a half has also witness a massive drive towards the promotion of
democratic institutions, values and practices in countries that in the past adopted forms
of social organisations inspired by democratic centralism or traditional clanic rule or that
were  characterized  by  outright  military  or  civilian  dictatorship.  The drive  towards
democracy was accompanied by the promotion of  a  (relatively)  free press and other
institutions such as free trade unions and NGOs that — in principle — help facilitate
economic development, the creation of efficient markets, an equitable social pact, good
governance, respect of minority rights and so on. Thus, the «democratic dividend» should
have  contributed  in  some  way  to  the  achievement  of  higher  levels  of  human
development, both directly (e.g. permitting greater individual freedom) and through an
improvement in the economy.
15 The empirical evidence in this area is, however, mixed mainly because it is quite difficult
to measure the extent and effective degree of democracy of a given country, as holding
regularly  elections  and  formally  allowing  freedom  of  association  are  in  itself  no
guarantee  that  a  real  «democracy  dividend»  can  be  enjoyed.  For  instance,  human
development has improved in the new «strong democracies» of Central Europe and South
Korea, but not in the new «weak democracies» dominated by the oligarchs (as in Russia)
or by political parties constituted along ethnic lines (as in Rwanda and Burundi), or in
countries  where  political  democracy  was  introduced  in  a  context  of  a  highly  un-
democratic distribution of resources (as in most of Latin America).
 
e) «The ITC revolution»
16 The last twenty years were also characterized by the third industrial revolution i.e. the
«Information and Tele-Communication (ITC) revolution». As on occasion of the two prior
industrial revolutions due to the introduction of the steam and combustion engine, the
adoption of the ITC technology has been estimated to accelerated the growth of GDP by
around one  percent  a  year  in  those  countries  were  have  such technology  had been
introduced on a sufficiently broad scale. While the effective rate of improvement due to
the «ITC revolution» depends on concrete country situations, here too one would have
expected — ex ante — a broad acceleration in the production of material wealth and the
provision of greater resources for human development. It must be noted also that such
new technology not only raises output through industry-  specific  effects  that  reduce
information and telecommunication costs, but that it also facilitates an overall circulation
of information from the more advanced countries of the North to the less developed ones
of the South.
 
Trends in human development over the last two
decades
17 With growing political attention being focused on human development by governments
and the international organisations — including United Nations, World Bank and IMF —
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and with the favourable changes mentioned above, one would have reasonably expected
an acceleration in the rate of improvement of human development, and in particular in
those key indicators such as the rate of infant and maternal mortality, the illiteracy rate,
and the poverty rate (i.e. the proportion of people living with less than one US dollar a
day) that gauge closely the overall changes taking place in human conditions.
18 These expectations were however only partially realized. Indeed, while over 1980-2000,
many  aggregate  indicators  of  human  development  continued  the  favourable  trend
initiated in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, the rate of improvement of such indicators was
slower, confined to fewer components of well-being and less equitably distributed than
that recorded over the prior thirty years. The literature indeed points to:
 
1. A slowdown in the rate of improvement in key indicators of
human development
19 The average  rate  of  decline  of  the  Infant  Mortality  Rate  (IMR,  Table  2)  and Under5
Mortality Rate (U5MR, not shown) slowed down perceptibly in the 1990s in relation to the
prior three decades. In East Asia and the European economies in transition, the pace of
decline was the slowest  in four decades.  In many African countries  affected by war,
economic stagnation and the AIOS epidemies, IMR and U5MR raze by up to 40 percent, as
suggested by recent Unicef-sponsored MICS surveys. Likewise, 15 of the 27 countries of
the former European Soviet bloc had in 1994 higher IMRs than in 1990, though since then
progress was re-established in most of them.
20 In Latin America, MENA and South Asia, the rapid gains of the 1980s, slowed down in the
1990s. The gains of the 1980s were in part attributable to social policies emphasizing the
rapid expansion of low-cost, public-health programmes such as immunization, but the
slow down of the 1990s cannot generally be attributed to a symmetric weakening of social
programs  and  social  expenditure.  Indeed,  the  data  on  public  expenditure  on  health
indicate that — on average — government efforts in this area remained broadly constant
(Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe may be an exception). Rather, the slowdown was
due — with few exceptions — to slow growth in family incomes, greater inequality, rising
income volatility (see later) and a rise in the number of local conflicts and humanitarian
emergencies. Mainstreaming further reductions in IMR will require therefore focusing
not  only  on  social  spending  but  also  on  improving  the  level  and  stability  of  family
incomes and an overall enhancement in the political climate.
21 A slow down over  the last  two decades  in the rate  of  health improvement  — a  key
component of human development — over the last two decades is confirmed by a study of
Cornia et al (2003) who tested empirically the relation between life expectancy at birth
(LEB) on the one side and GDP per capita and income inequality on the other on the basis
of quinquennial data for the «Golden Age Era» (1960-1980) and the «Globalisation Era»
(1985-2000). The study found that the constant term of the regression was higher in the
second period, probably reflecting the improvement in health technology and the spread
of health information. However, it also found that the negative coefficient of the Gini
index (measuring the impact of income inequality) was greater for 1985-2000 than for
1960-80, suggesting that the impact of inequality on health rose in intensity, perhaps
because of the increased weight of «undeserved income inequality» due to rent-seeking
and opportunistic enrichment that flourished with the rise of  financial  rents,  insider
privatisation and the award of generous stock options to top managers. Conversely, the
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positive  coefficient  of  GDP  per  capita  became  smaller  during  the  Globalisation  Era,
indicating that an additional increase in GDP per capita had — on average — a lesser
effect on health than in the past,  possibly because the «quality of GDP» deteriorated
possibly because of a rise in its volatility and informality.
22 These results are sample specific and need to be tested on a broader sample, but are
statistically significant and fairly robust. They were used to simulate the health impact of
the slowdown in GDP growth, rise in inequality and changes in regression parameters
recorded during the Globalisation Era (see later). The simulation shows that- while life
expectancy was in 2000 higher than in 1980 in most countries — it was respectively 2.06
and 1.42 years lower in low income and middle — income countries in relation to the case
in  which  GDP  growth,  income  inequality,  health  technology  and  the  regression
parameters had remained the same as during the Golden Era.
 
2. Smaller gains in child nutrition
23 With the exception of Latin America, the incidence of malnutrition among children of
0-59 months of age declined less in the 1990s than in the 1980s or 1970s (Table 3). The
situation is  most  worrying in the Middle  East  and North Africa (MENA) and in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) — where the absolute number of underweight children actually rose
in  the  1990s.  A  host  of  local  studies  confirms  that  child  malnutrition  remains  an
unresolved problem, including in middle-income countries of Latin America and South
East Asia.
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24 Child nutrition is sensitive to changes in health status, adult time allocated to childcare
and the level, stability and distribution of family incomes — i.e. variables that have shown
unfavourable trends over the last two decades in over 80 developing and transitional
countries. For instance, the stagnation or decline in the last 10-15 years in the incomes of
agricultural labourers in India despite an acceleration in GDP growth may be a factor in
the slow decline in child malnutrition in South Asia.
25 Growing economic instability may also have been a factor since sharp short-term declines
in family income — whose frequency intensified in parallel with the spread of financial
crises — can cause long-term stunting in very young children. World Bank studies of the
impact of the Mexican and Thai financial crises of the 1990s show, for instance, that even
after the recovery took place, child malnutrition remained high as some children suffered
irreversible damages during these crises.
 
3. Increasing relative distance in well-being between countries and
regions
26 The 1980s and 1990s were also characterised by a rise in the relative distance in levels of
human development among regions, countries and social groups. The first two effects are
illustrated  in  Table  4  by  the  rise  in  the  coefficient  of  variation  (CV),  an  index  that
measures the relative distance of regional IMRs from the world mean, and the average
relative distance of national IMRs from their regional average. These data suggest that
over 1980-98 the gains in IMR were distributed in an increasingly more skewed way
between «winners» and «losers».
27 The countries with the highest IMRs (Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) recorded slower
proportional improvements than regions with better initial IMRs, a fact that led to a
divergence in IMR levels among regions (last line of Table 4). Indeed, the intra-regional
differences in IMR rose remarkably as shown by the rise in the coefficient of variation
from 0.74 to 0.89 between 1980 and 1998. This divergence would be even more marked if
more  realistic  IMR  data  from  Eastern  Europe  and  Africa  were  factored  in.  In  turn,
increasing  intra-regional  divergence  in  IMRs  appears  to  correlate  closely  with  the
increased divergence in economic performance among regions and with the intensity of
local conflicts and new pandemics.
Growth Patterns, International Finance and human Development: the experience ...
Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 4 | 2014
8
28 A similar pattern of divergence is observed within all developing regions except Latin
America, a finding that reinforces the viewpoint that recent gains in IMR have varied
substantially  across  countries  part  of  the  same  region.  The  sharpest  divergence  is
apparent in South Asia and MENA.
 
4. An unbalanced distribution of the gains in human development
within countries
29 The  average  national  gains  in  well-being  recorded  within  each  nation  have  been
distributed in about half of the cases analysed in an increasingly polarised manner among
socials groups, and in particular among various groups of children (male/female, urban/
rural, rich/poor, born to educated/illiterate mothers, etc.). Analysis of the limited DHS-
based data on changes in the within-country distribution of well-being shows that there
are as many cases of divergence as of convergence, with convergence being most common
in education and divergence most common in the field of health. In particular:
30 — most indicators of school enrolment indicate that there has been convergence among
different social groups. The primary and secondary enrolment rates of boys versus girls
converge — for instance — in the majority of countries, as an expansion of education was
more likely to benefit girls than boys, while its stagnation or decline penalised girls more
than boys.
31 — in contrast, for most DHS-based indicators of child health, the improvements occurred
at vastly different rates. In Latin America, the ratio of rural-urban IMR widened in five
out of six countries analyzed (Table 5) as gains appear to have been concentrated in the
urban sector.  A detailed analysis  of  the distribution of  gains  in child health in Peru
carried out by UNICEF Lima confirms that gains in IMR were much higher in a few urban
areas, including in low-income neighbourhoods, than in rural areas.
32 Likewise, the ratio between the IMR of children born to mothers with higher education
and those born to mothers with primary education or less worsened due to a slower
improvement for the latter group (Cornia and Menchini 2002).
33 — in the 1980s, the ratio of the USMR of the children of the poorest 20 percent of families
(ranked according to an «household asset index») to that of the top 20 per cent of the
same  distribution  ranged  between  1.3  to  4.7  in  a  sample  of  20  countries  that  had
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undertaken  a  DHS  survey.  Between  the  1980s  and  1990s,  such  gaps  worsened  in  16
countries, remained constant in two and improved only in two.
 
5. A very slow decline in poverty rates
34 The slow gains in human development are confirmed by the changes recorded on the
poverty front. In 1990 the World Development Report of the World Bank projected a drop
in the number of the poor from 1183 to 825 millions (28.3 to 18.0 per cent) in the total
number (rate) of people living on less than one $PPP/day between 1987 and 2000. Such
predictions, however, have not materialized and — outside China — the number of the
poor has risen by about one hundred million, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa and South
Asia (Table 6). Likewise, outside China, the poverty rate fell by a modest 0.18 percentage
points a year as against a planned yearly decline of one percent.
 
6. Summing up
35 Notwithstanding the limited availability of data permitting to analyze the evolution over
time of social differentials in human well-being, it appears that the last 20 years were
characterized  by  slower  aggregate  gains  and  their  increasingly  unequal  distribution
among social groups. Improvements mainly benefited the middle — and high — income
urban groups and favoured some regions and countries while the disadvantaged areas,
social groups and nations recorded limited or no improvements. While in many cases this
increasing divergence resulted from a faster pace of improvement among the better-off,
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there have also been cases of absolute deterioration in well-being for poor and marginal
populations and countries.
 
What explains these disappointing results?
36 What explains these only partially satisfactory trends in human development? Obviously,
they  depend  on  a  variety  of  factors  which  include  —  among  others  —  the  level,
distribution and stability of household incomes; public expenditure on basic health and
education; social policies in various areas; adult time; the prices of basic goods and some
other factors. While space limitations do not allow to review here changes in all these
variables, we focus on the main changes in growth pattern and international financing of
development to start discerning the measures needed to rekindle progress in human
well-being.
 
1. A slow growth in GDP and household income
37 Slow  growth  or,  worse,  a  decline  in  average  family  income  affects  the  pace  of
improvement  in  several  aspects  of  human  well-being  in  both  the  monetary  and
capabilities spaces. The impact is particularly pronounced in the field of nutrition and
poverty, and especially in the 120 or so economies with a GDP per capita of less than US
$2,000 PPP.
38 Despite the favourable changes induced by the end of the Cold War, the transition to the
market economy and democracy, the spread of the ITC revolution and a «demographic
gift» involving some 4/5 of the developing and transitional countries, the last 20 years
have witnessed a decline in the rate of growth of world GNP per capita (Table 7) from 2.6
per cent a year over 179 particularly weak in the 1990s. China and India are the main
exceptions to this rule. In these two countries, the acceleration of growth was associated
with some domestic liberalization, greater export orientation and some opening up of the
economy though these reforms followed a distinctly homegrown pattern and were more
selective and gradual than the standard prescription.
39 Stagnant or slow growth affects family income and public revenue and thus influences
the resources available to keep a child well nourished, in good health and in school or to
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promote human development more broadly. As noted, falling family incomes have been
shown to have a particularly bad effect on child malnutrition.
 
2. Increasing growth volatility and instability of family income
40 In  the  absence  of  adequate  social  safety  nets  (which  are  little  developed  in  most
countries),  growth volatility has a negative effect on well-being.  For instance,  during
periods of recession, children may be taken out of school, adults may enter hazardous
jobs or be forced to adopt other unsustainable survival strategies. Growth volatility rose
sharply in Latin America in the 1980s before declining moderately in the 1990s, while it
surged in East Asia and in the Eastern European bloc in the 1990s. In Africa, meanwhile,
war and natural disasters contributed to mounting instability. The main overall source of
unsteadiness  was,  however,  an  epidemie  of  banking,  financial  and  currency  crises
triggered by the domestic financial deregulation of the late 1980s and the liberalization of
international  portfolio  flows of  the 1990s.  These crises  have had a  severe impact  on
human well-being (see later). In Russia, for instance, the crude death rate rose by almost
20 per cent between late 1998 and the first ha1f of 2000 following the financial crisis and
currency devaluation of August 1998.
 
3. Rising inequality in the distribution of household income
41 Human development is negatively affected by high or rising income inequality. Over 1980
and the mid 1990s, income inequality rose in 48 of the 73 countries with reliable time-
series data (Table 8). If the impact of the financial crises of the late 1990s is factored in,
the  number  of  countries  with  growing  inequality  rises  to  53  (still  out  of  73).  While
inequality fell in nine countries, these were mainly small and medium sized ones whose
combined population and GDP-PPP account for only 4 and 8 per cent of the world total.
the rise in inequality was universal in the former Soviet Bloc, almost universal in Latin
America and the OECD and frequent in South, South East and East Asia. In about half of
these cases, the surge in inequality was large or very large and appears to be related to
the deregulation of domestic banking and international financial flows and to widespread
reductions  in  tax  rates.  In  contrast,  trade  liberalization,  appears  to  have  had  an
ambiguous effect on the distribution of house hold incomes.
42 When occurring from an already high level  or if  it  is  very large,  a rise in inequality
generates  a  number  of  negative  effects.  It  slows  the  pace  at  which  poverty  and
malnutrition are reduced by aggregate income growth and pushes  into destitution a
larger number of  families than in the case of  more egalitarian growth.  For instance,
strongly  urban-focused  growth  (a  common  occurrence  in  the  1990s)  raised  overall
inequality and did not reduce perceptibly rural poverty. In addition, when the recorded
increase in inequality is sizeable, growth itself might be reduced, as a very high income
polarisation  erodes  the  work  incentives  of  the  poor  and  political  instability.  High
inequality,  in  other  words,  can reduce  growth and in  this  way affect  further  family
incomes,  poverty  and well-being.  Finally,  high  inequality  erodes  social  cohesion and
adversely affects the ability of communities to undertake collective action including in
the field of health.
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4. Growing employment informality and instability
43 Another unfavourable aspect of the recent growth pattern outside East Asia (where the
number  of  formal  sector  job  has  steadily  risen)  is  the  growing  informalization  of
employment.  This  is  a complex  phenomenon  that  depends  on  various  factors.  For
instance, to compete in the global economy large firms outsource production tasks to a
chain of ever-smaller subcontractors who provide unstable and low paying employment.
Likewise, domestic firms may respond to the appreciation of their currency caused by
capital inflows by subcontracting some production tasks to informal, low-wage firms. The
shrinking  of  the  public  sector  (as  in  the  economies  in  transition)  following  the
introduction  of  economic  reforms  is  another  source  of  informalisation,  as  it  is  the
introduction of the ITC technology that permits to easily decentralize a number of work
tasks. For the majority of the people affected by this trend, the wage rate, conditions and
duration of employment, employment stability, skill content of work and so on tend to
worsen. In addition, the scarce data available indicate that the wage distribution in the
informal sector is more skewed than in the formal one, and that tax collection among
informal firms is very low.
 
5. Changes in public expenditure on health, education and welfare
44 In a globalizing world, revenue collection — and, through this, public expenditure on
human development-may be affected because of the «tax competition» among developing
countries  trying  to  attract  foreign direct  investments.  A  preliminary  examination of
aggregate public expenditure data, however, does not provide evidence of a systematic
fall  of  the  social  spending/GDP  ratio  during  the  1990s.  In  low-income  developing
countries, public expenditure on health stagnated at a low 1.1 per cent of GDP over 1990-6
while  that  on  education  fell  marginally  from 3.4  to  3.2  per  cent.  In  middle-income
countries there was a perceptible rise in public spending on education and a modest one
on health. Such results are somewhat puzzling and may conceal unfavourable shifts in
the intrasectoral allocation of public expenditure (e.g. between basic and hospital-based
care). In addition, it is unclear whether social spending was able to compensate the fall of
foreign  aid  in  this  area  experienced  in  the  1990s  in  many  middle  and  low-income
countries (see later). Finally, a clear fall in public expenditure for human development
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was evident, in most economies in transition or affected by political instability where
health and education expenditure fell both as a share of a fast-shrinking GDP and in per
capita  terms,  but  there  are  several  examples  (e.g.  in  Latin  America)  in  which social
expenditure was sustained or was raised moderately.
 
6. Problems in the domestic and international financing of
development
45 One  of  the  recent  developments  that  possibly  contributed  to  the  slow  and  skewed
improvements in human development discussed above concerns the so-called «financing
of development», i.e. the mobilisation of domestic and foreign resources for investment,
social improvement and growth in the developing countries. An analysis of such topic
requires  the  examination  of  changes  in  the  domestic  mobilisation  of  resources,
international financial flows and aid flows.
46 As far as the mobilisation of domestic resources is concerned, it must be reminded that
while low-income countries have traditionally had on average low savings rates, several
of them have exhibited in the past the ability to mobilise large amounts of resources at
the national level. For instance, Japan, China, Taiwan and other countries in East Asia
have habitually displayed high domestic savings rates (in the range of 25-30 percent of
GDP) while Latin America and Africa have traditionally lagged behind in this area. While
domestic policies to develop an efficient savings and banking infrastructure covering all
sectors of the economy (including the small and medium enterprises and the agricultural
sector) have been shown to be essential for development, such objective has remained
broadly unfulfilled outside the main urban centres of many countries. Exceptions to this
rule concern the development of a capillary network of post offices administering saving
schemes in Japan, of mutual credit cooperatives and provident funds in East Asia, and of
subsidized rural banking in part of India (until the early 1990s). In most other cases, the
banking sector of the developing countries remained underdeveloped and characterized
by a few, large (and often) state-controlled banks unable to reach the small entrepreneurs
and savers, paying negative interest rates on deposits, and providing limited financing to
the economy as most savings were used to finance the budget deficit.
47 Over  the  last  2  decades  domestic  savings  creation  has  been  influenced  by  the
liberalisation of the domestic financial sector (inspired by the «financial de-repression»
approach recommended by Prof. McKinnon), that tried to remedy to the problems caused
by financial repression by promoting the privatisation of state banks, the opening up to
foreign banks and non-bank financial institutions, the freeing of lending practices (and,
in  particular,  of  the  obligation  of  the  banking  sector  to  purchase  low interest  state
bonds), the liberalisation of interest rates, credit volume, and so on.
48 Particularly in weak and poorly regulated economies still  suffering from large budget
deficit, these reforms backfired in a number of ways. While the number of private and
foreign banks increased and while the share of credit received by the private sector rose
as well, real interest rates jumped to very high real levels, while the spreads, banking
concentration and credit share received by the FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate)
sector moved in excess of any reasonable threshold. Also, contrary to the expectations of
the proponents of domestic financial liberalisation, credit to small scale agriculture and
industry fell while the number of rural branches of national banks contracted in many
countries. In addition, the number of new small and inherently unstable banks rose (in
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Latvia in the early 1990s people were allowed to open a bank with an initial capital of only
20,000 US dollars) together with that of non-bank financial institutions not subject to
Central  Bank  oversight.  As  a  result,  one  of  the  main  effects  of  domestic  financial
liberalization was a marked rise in banking crises and financial instability, which affected
many low and middle-income countries as well as a few generally well-managed high
income countries such as Finland and Sweden. There were of course a few successes (one
of them being Mauritius). These countries liberalized their banking system gradually and
only after having stabilized their budget deficit, adopted a flexible exchange rate policy,
and simultaneous developed strong institutions of financial control and regulation. In
most Western European countries, in contrast, after some initial failures, liberalisation
seem to have increased competition in the banking industry.
49 A second recent change in the field of domestic financing with potentially positive effect
on human development has concerned the spontaneous or state — or donor supported
proliferation of micro-credit schemes and Development Finance Institutions (DFI) aiming
at increasing the volume of micro loans to people unable to put up any collateral and to
bear significant transaction costs. Most of the micro-credit schemes and DFI introduced
important financial innovations (such as group lending or credit history) that allowed
them to lend, for instance, to micro entrepreneurs, women and small farmers without
any collateral. The spread of micro-credit and DFI has often had an important effect on
the incames of the poor and on their human development as, as noted above, both before
and  after  the  recent  financial  liberalization,  the  formal  financial  sector  and  the
traditional  moneylenders provided loans to only a  very small  proportion of  farmers,
artisans and micro-entrepreneurs. A thorough assessment of the impact of micro-credit
schemes is still not available, but the international evidence available so far shows that
they have usually generated positive effects on the volume of credit received by the poor
and their living conditions. Yet, such schemes (that are often of a rather small scale) have
not reached — and perhaps cannot reach — a sufficiently large number of customers, nor
have they provided loans with long enough maturities and adequate supporting services
able to solve the medium and long term financing problems of the mass of the poor.
Finally, the micro-economic efficiency of such schemes has not been uniformly positive.
While some of them (like the celebrated Grameen Bank) have been characterized by high
repayment rates, adequate profits and a strong impact on poverty alleviation, others have
exhibited less encouraging results.
50 The third important development in this area concerns the international financing of
development.  This  too  has  also  undergone profound changes  during  the  last  twenty
years.  International financial  flows to the developing countries take many forms and
include export credits (of a duration of less than a year),  aid flows (both private and
official),  bank loans,  foreign direct  investments  and portfolio  flows consisting in the
purchase  of  bonds,  stocks  and  other  financial  instruments  (Table  9).  Net  of
reimbursements  and  payments  of  interests  and  dividends,  over  1974-82  the  overall
transfer of public and private financial resources from the North to the South averaged
2.5 percent of GDP of the developing countries and was dominated by official credits and
grants and bank sovereign loans. During the «debt decade»of the 1980s the overall net
transfer  of  resources  became  negative  (equal  to  —  0.3  percent  of  the  GDP  of  the
developing countries) as new bank loans dried up and the servicing of the interest on the
foreign debt ballooned. As illustrated in Table 9, over the 1990s the overall transfer of
financial resources resumed steadily (with almost a tripling of resource transfers between
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1990  and  1997)  and  amounted  on  average  to  some  2.8  percent  of  the  GDP  of  the
developing countries.
51 Such  positive  increase  in  total  financial  flows  to  the  developing  countries  masks,
however, a number of profound and less favourable changes:
52 — to start with, the amount of foreign aid is falling both in absolute terms and relative to
the GDP of the donor countries. At the moment, foreign aid (i.e. grants from both state
and NGO sources) account to around 0.25-0.30% of the GDP of the Northern countries as
against the target of 1% set by the Pearson Report, and as against the 0.4% recorded in the
1970s and 1980s. In addition, such aid is allocated in ways that are increasingly related to
performance  (i.e.  if  «good»  macroeconomic  policies  inspired  by  the  Washington
Consensus  are  in  place),  while  its  quality  has  stagnated  in  many  countries  as  the
Development  Assistance  Committee  of  the  OECD  has  been  unsuccessful  in  'untying'
bilateral aid from all sort of clauses, such as the obligation to buy equipment and hire
experts  from  the  donor  country.  Such  equipment  and  expert  services  often  cost  a
multiple of the world market price.
53 Why  is  international  aid  falling?  Because  of  the  perception  that  the  international
financial markets can take care of the financing needs of all developing countries. The
literature  mentions  also  some  «aid  fatigue»  and  growing  conditionality  about  the
adoption of neoliberal policies and democratic institutions and about respecting human
rights  on the side of  the beneficiary countries.  Finally,  foreign aid has declined also
because of the slow debt relief granted to poor developing countries included in the HIPC
initiative. Such program requires a long track record of 'good policies' and has been slow
in tacking effect.
54 — second, after a recovery in the mid 1990s, bank lending (both sovereign and private)
started declining (Table 9) and is now lower than in the early 1990s.
55 — third, the increase in aggregate financial flows recorded in the 1990s is explained in
good part by a rise in foreign direct investments (FDI) (Table 9). Such increase is generally
thought to have generated a positive effect on development (especially in the case of
manufacturing investments, less so in the case of investments in the primary sector), as it
has brought with it a stable flow of money, the transfer of technical and managerial skills
and greater ability to penetrate export markets. But FDIs have hardly been a panacea for
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the vast majority of developing and transitional economies, as illustrated by Table 10 that
shows that most countries were bypassed by such flows. FDI are in fact mainly directed
towards the OECD countries (USA and UK in primis) that received about 70 percent of all
FDI. As for the developing nations, FDI were concentrated in Brazil, Mexico and a dozen of
East and South East Asian countries. Indeed, the first «emerging nations» absorbed 75
percent of the total FDI received by the developing nations.
56 FDI are thus concentrated into very few developing nations and therefore offer no way to
accelerate capital accumulation and foster human development in the remaining 150 low
and middle income countries bypassed by them. In addition, the stream of FDI to some
developing countries (e.g. the Latin American ones) has been closely connected to the
acquisition  of  privatized  state  assets.  They  have  consisted  therefore  more  in  the
acquisition  of  existing  firms  rather  than  in  new «greenfield  investments».  With  the
privatisation of state assets nearing its end in several nations, one wonders whether the
aggregate flow of FDI will remain as high as in the recent past. Finally, even in the
countries that recorded adequate inflows of foreign investments, the expected increase of
total investments (foreign plus domestic) has often been elusive, as a rise in the former
has been in some cases been accompanied by a fall in domestic investment, with limited
or  no effect  on the overall  rate  of  capital  accumulation but  at  a  cost  of  heightened
dependence on foreign resources. With some exceptions, therefore, FDI have not helped
solving the problem of financing of development of the poorer countries.
57 — fourth, over the last ten years, the most dynamic component of international finance
has been the so called «portfolio flows», i.e. the purchase of stocks, bonds, derivatives and
similar  financial  instruments  by  the  non-resident  population.  This  kind of  flows has
generated, however, a number of problems. To start with, rising private inflows into the
developing countries were in part offset by a large outflows of domestic funds (equal to
30-50% of the funds inflow) as national investors sought to diversify their portfolio by
purchasing foreign stocks and bonds. The inflow of short term portfolio flows induced
also a rapid and costly reserve accumulation by the Central Bank in order to face possible
flow reversal and currency attacks. It also caused very frequently an appreciation of the
exchange  rate  of  the  countries  of  destination  of  such  flows,  with  the  net  effect  of
discouraging exports,  employment  and human development.  But  the worst  aspect  of
these short term financial flows have been the instability they have caused in financial,
currency and stock markets, and the sharp recessions and huge human costs that have
followed from these events. The social impact of the financial crises is underscored by the
World Bank (2000) that shows that financial liberalisation raises the poverty rate over the
short and the long term. As shown in Table 11, such increase in poverty persists even
after the economy has returned to full-capacity growth (Table 11). Analyses based on
micro data show that the impact on poverty is transmitted via differential employment,
wages,  price  and  income  distribution  effects  that  affect  the  lower  deciles  of  the
population especially hard. In brief, these type of flows tend to generate limited benefits,
to  cause  recurring  financial  instability  that  affects  also  «innocent  bystanders»  via
financial, trade and other forms of 'contagion', as shown by the case of Uruguay whose
GDP fell in 2000 by a massive 11 percent because of the contagion of the Argentinean
crisis  that  caused a  drastic  drop in  the  number  of  Argentinean tourists  visiting  the
country.
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58 In  conclusion,  while  the  increase  in  aggregate  international  financial  flows  to  the
developing  countries  in  the  1990s  could  have  —  in  principle  —  facilitated  human
development in many parts of the world, such flows have been excessively concentrated
on a handful of middle income countries: In addition, aid flows to nations (such as the
least developed countries and some middle income country such as Jamaica) that have
almost no access to loans and FDI and depend increasingly on grants declined sharply.
Finally growing financial instability has eroded many of the potential benefits of such
increased flow or resources, especially in the emerging countries.
 
Conclusions
59 This paper has reviewed the changes in human development over the last twenty years
and  related  them  to  a  number  of  potentially  positive  epochal  events,  the  changes
intervened in the1990s in the pattern of growth (especially its speed, stability, inequality,
informality and public expenditure) and the shifts that have occurred in the domestic and
international financing of development. Changes in these areas have facilitated human
development in a few countries and for some social groups but have largely bypassed or
— worse — caused a retrogression in the well-being in quite a number of countries and
groups that were bypassed by the expansion of world exports and international finance.
60 While  human  development  and  poverty  alleviation  have  become  the  central  policy
objective of the international community and of many developing countries, the policy
changes intervened in the field of domestic and external liberalisation and the tendencies
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evolving  in  the  area  of  the  financing  of  development  have  likely  rendered  the
achievement of such human objectives problematic in many countries.
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ABSTRACTS
While  the  concept  of  human  development  has  gained  considerable  academic  and  political
acceptance, most indicators in this field recorded during the last twenty years slower rates of
improvement than over 1960-80, while exhibiting a marked divergence both between and within
countries.  Improvements  mainly  benefited  the  middle  and  high-income  urban  groups  and
favored some regions and countries while the disadvantaged areas, social groups and nations
recorded  limited  or  no  improvements.  These  only  partially  satisfactory  trends  appear  to  be
related  in  many  countries  to  a  stagnation  or  decline  in  household  incomes,  a  rise  in  their
volatility,  their  increasingly  more  unequal  distribution  and  growing  problems  in  the
international  financing  of  development  in  poor  countries.  There  is  no  general  evidence,  in
contrast,  that  a  worsening  in  the  amount  and  distribution  of  public  social  expenditure
contributed to the above trends.
Apesar do conceito de desenvolvimento ter ganho uma aceitação crescente nos meios académicos
e políticos,  nos últimos 20 anos muitos indicadores no terreno têm vindo a revelar taxas de
crescimento inferiores às dos anos 1960-1980, acentuando-se os desequilíbrios quer no interior
dos países, quer entre eles. O crescimento tem beneficiado principalmente os grupos sociais de
médio ou elevado rendimento e favorecido apenas algumas regiões e países, enquanto que os
grupos sociais, os países e as áreas mais deprimidas não registam progressos assinaláveis. Estes
resultados  em  alguns  países  parecem  estar  relacionados  com  a  estagnação  ou  o  declínio  do
rendimento  familiar,  a  sua  crescente  volatilidade  e  desigual  distribuição,  bem  como  com  a
instabilidade do financiamento internacional  ao desenvolvimento dos países pobres.  Mas,  em
contrapartida, não existe qualquer prova de que o declínio no valor e distribuição da renda social
seja o responsável por essa tendência.
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